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Two Cases, One Corner: The Payoff Matrix Hiding on Gallowtree Gate

Leicester Maths
Two Cases, One Corner: The Payoff Matrix Hiding on Gallowtree Gate

Photo: Artaxerxes, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons

It's twenty past eleven on a Saturday and Gallowtree Gate is doing what it always does — a river of shoppers, a queue outside the bakery, someone handing out leaflets nobody wants, and a guitarist by the Clock Tower who has clearly found the loudest, busiest square metre in the city.

Fifty metres away it's a different job. Less footfall, better acoustics, a bench, and a steady supply of people who stop for a coffee and actually listen. That's where the fiddle player sets up.

Neither performer knows the other is coming. Both choose at roughly the same moment. Simultaneous choices, shared consequences — that's all a game needs.

The pitch problem, written down

Strip the real decision to its bones. Two pitches: Clock Tower (busy, noisy, high traffic) and Market (quieter, more lingerers). Two buskers, A and B, each picking one for a two-hour Saturday slot without seeing the other's choice. Land on the same pitch and you split the crowd, fight the acoustics and earn less than either of you would alone.

Score the outcomes in pounds per session. Each cell reads (A's takings, B's takings).

B: Clock Tower B: Market
A: Clock Tower (£10, £10) (£35, £12)
A: Market (£12, £35) (£18, £18)

Read a row across: if A takes the Clock Tower, A earns £10 when B is also there and £35 when B has gone to the market. Read a column down: if B takes the market, B earns £35 when A is at the Clock Tower and £12 when A turns up too.

First lesson: look for a dominant strategy

The opening move in any payoff matrix is to ask whether one option beats the other no matter what the opponent does.

For A: if B goes to the Clock Tower, A gets £10 there but £12 at the market — so market wins that branch. If B goes to the market, A gets £35 at the Clock Tower against £18 at the market — so the Clock Tower wins. A's best choice flips depending on B, and by symmetry the same is true for B.

No dominant strategy. That is not a dead end; it is the whole point of the puzzle. Decisions that depend on someone else's decision are the ones worth modelling.

Two equilibria, and no way to pick between them

A Nash equilibrium is a pair of choices where neither player regrets their move once they see the other's. Test the cells.

Take (A: Clock Tower, B: Market). A earns £35; switching to the market drops A to £18. B earns £12; switching to the Clock Tower drops B to £10. Nobody wants to move. Equilibrium.

Now (A: Market, B: Clock Tower). Identical logic, mirrored. Also an equilibrium.

And (Clock Tower, Clock Tower)? Both would rather defect: £10 becomes £12 by walking away. Not stable. Same for (Market, Market): £18 becomes £35 by leaving.

So there are two pure equilibria, both consisting of the pair splitting up, and nothing inside the game tells them who goes where. Notice the money too: each equilibrium pays out £47 in total, against £20 for a double-booked Clock Tower and £36 for a soggy pair of market sets. Spreading out is worth something — the buskers just can't agree on it without a signal.

The mixed-strategy surprise

What if they randomise instead? Suppose B heads to the Clock Tower with probability p. A's expected takings from the Clock Tower are 10p + 35(1 − p); from the market, 12p + 18(1 − p). At the mixed equilibrium A is indifferent, so set them equal:

35 − 25p = 18 − 6p, giving 17 = 19p, so p = 17/19 ≈ 0.89.

Read that again: even when both players randomise optimally, each of them is at the Clock Tower nearly nine Saturdays in ten. They collide most weeks, and the collision is precisely what keeps them indifferent between the two pitches. The expected take is 240/19, about £12.63 each — less than either pure equilibrium, which is a neat little lesson about what a crowd of independent optimisers can do to itself.

A forty-minute classroom version

Give each pair a blank 2×2 grid and the numbers above, then run this sequence:

  1. Predict. Thirty seconds, no discussion, each student writes which pitch they'd pick.
  2. Play twelve rounds. Pairs play simultaneously with a show of hands, tallying real earnings. No talking between rounds.
  3. Compare. Plot the class's round-by-round choices against the matrix. How often did you both end up in the £10, £10 cell?
  4. Allow one text message. One free signal per round changes everything — count how fast the class settles into a split.
  5. Change one number. Add a £5 pitch fee for the Clock Tower corner, or a third busker, or a rainy forecast that halves footfall everywhere. Recalculate the equilibria.

The step from step 4 to step 5 is where the real learning sits. Models are not answers; they are machines for asking "what if?".

Where Leicester keeps feeding the model

Real pitches are messier than a 2×2 grid. The Clock Tower corner is louder on matchdays when the Welford Road crowd drifts through town. Diwali on the Golden Mile pulls thousands of people in one direction. The Christmas market rearranges the entire map for six weeks. Busking licences, amps and the council's rules all shift the payoffs, and every shift redraws the equilibrium.

That's the appeal. You don't need a spreadsheet to start — you need two buskers, one corner, and the willingness to write down four numbers and take them seriously.

Next Saturday, watch where they set up. There's a decent chance they've solved it without knowing the notation.

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